Still Searching for the Wage Curve : Evidence from Germany and Italy by Ammermüller, Andreas et al.
Dis cus si on Paper No. 07-008
Still Searching for the Wage Curve:
Evidence from Germany and Italy
Andreas Ammermueller, Claudio Lucifora, 
Federica Origo, and Thomas Zwick
Dis cus si on Paper No. 07-008
Still Searching for the Wage Curve:
Evidence from Germany and Italy
Andreas Ammermueller, Claudio Lucifora, 
Federica Origo, and Thomas Zwick
Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von 
neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung 
der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.
Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW  research prompt ly avai la ble to other 
eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly 
respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.




This study confirms our theoretical hypotheses that there are several wage curves for 
different groups and countries. Despite the large gaps in unemployment rates among 
different areas (mainly between Northern and Southern regions in Italy and East and 
West in Germany), geographical wage differentials have remained relatively stable over 
time and fairly insulated from local labour market conditions. This suggests that the 
traditional negative relationship linking wage levels to local unemployment rates - the 
wage curve – is not a proper description of reality for all employee groups in all EU 
countries. Especially in the Italian labour market the relevant coefficients often show 
the wrong sign and they are in general not statistically significant. In the case of 
Germany, results are instead quite sensitive to the model specification and the group 
considered. We find that especially the labour market in East Germany, as well as 
females and the low educated encounter a relatively high wage elasticity to changes in 
regional unemployment. In both countries, the reaction of wages to local unemployment 
varies significantly along the wage distribution, being more sensitive for the median 
quantiles. 
The data used reveal also the existence of inertia in the wage adjustment process: 
more specifically neither a wage curve, nor a Phillips curve specification therefore seem 
to provide an adequate description of wage determination in both Italy and Germany. 
These results thus give additional evidence which casts some doubts on studies based 
on either of the above specifications. 
Based on theoretical considerations we try to explain the differences between groups 
in the estimated wage curves. The structure of collective bargaining in Italy, where 
national agreements appear to be still effective in ensuring little dispersion in wage 
levels across areas, may be a reason. Furthermore, if the large size of the informal sector 
in Italy is taken into account, then these findings might simply indicate that adjustment 
does not occur in the regular sector of the economy, but rather outside of it. This 
interpretation seems particularly suggestive, though the lack of detailed information on 
the informal sector makes it only tentative.  
In East Germany and for employees in the middle of the wage curve it might not be 
financially interesting to react to unemployment changes by migrating to other parts of 
the country or leaving the labour force. Therefore, wages react to changes in 
unemployment for these groups giving rise to a wage curve. 
Concluding, our estimations cast doubt on the applicability of a universal empirical law 
that the unemployment elasticity of pay is around -0.1 (Blanchflower and Oswald, 
1994a; Card, 1995). The striking likeness of hundreds of regressions on this subject 
may be based on the small variance in estimation techniques, publication bias, and a 
disregard of some basic econometric problems, such as the endogeneity of the 
unemployment variable, time lags in the transmission and data on wages that do not 
take into account cyclical movements of hours worked.
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The existence and persistence of significant differences in economic conditions and in 
factor prices across areas within a country are common phenomena to most 
industrialised countries. This evidence might be difficult to reconcile with the 
“standard” description of the functioning of labour markets. However, when 
“amenities”1, the labour market attachment, the composition of the labour force or 
labour market rigidities vary substantially across areas, dispersion in wages and 
economic conditions may well characterise a (long run) equilibrium. In this context, the 
analysis of local labour markets on the basis of micro-economic data can provide useful 
insights on why large fluctuations in slackness of the local labour markets lead to rather 
small changes in real wages. 
The OECD points to Germany and Italy as prime examples in Europe for large and 
persistent regional disparities on the labour market (OECD, 2000). In both countries the 
correlation between net migration and unemployment rates by region is quite strong. 
However, the scale of movement is not sufficient to act as a rapid adjustment 
mechanism. Although both countries are similar in their large regional disparities and 
rather inflexible labour markets, labour market attachment in the “weaker part” of the 
countries (i.e. the South in Italy and the East in Germany) differs diametrically. While 
participation in East Germany, especially of females, is higher than in the West and 
does not respond to changes in the unemployment rate, participation in the South of 
Italy is lower than in the North and especially female participation reacts to changes in 
the unemployment rate. As the labour market attachment of particular groups is key to a 
proper understanding of the adjustment mechanisms on the labour markets, a 
comparative investigation of both countries seems especially promising. 
This paper aims at investigating the functioning of local labour markets in Germany 
and Italy. In particular, we estimate the relationship linking wage levels to local 
unemployment rates, the so-called wage curve. There are almost 1000 estimates 
demonstrating that wage curves differ for sub-groups, regions and countries. Very few 
tested hypotheses on the variation in the slope of the wage curve across groups of 
                                                          
1  This term is intended to include all those factors that affect the welfare of individuals living in a 
certain area and their inclination to migrate. Examples are the environment, prices of non market services, 
housing prices, social networks etc.. 
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workers and sectors, however (Card, 1995; Nijkamp and Poot, 2005). Our main 
contribution to the literature therefore is to motivate why the results differ and derive 
hypotheses on the functioning of the regional labour markets. We also tackle estimation 
problems such as unobserved heterogeneity (using fixed effects), lags in the 
transmission of the unemployment effect, and endogeneity of regional unemployment 
(using instrumental variables). Finally, we test the robustness of our results by splitting 
the sample into different employee groups and regions and running wage quantile 
regressions. According to our theoretical hypotheses, we find widely diverging results, 
depending on the group in focus and the estimation method used. 
In light of the aspects mentioned above, we discuss some theoretical considerations 
on the functioning of the labour market in section 2. Section 3 presents the Italian and 
German institutional setting, while section 4 offers an overview of the main stylised 
facts concerning the functioning of local labour markets in the two countries in the last 
decades. The empirical analysis of the wage - (local) unemployment relationship and 
the econometric model estimated are presented in section 5. The last section contains 
the concluding remarks and some policy implications. 
 
 
2 Unemployment and Wages 
The relationship between unemployment and wages has often been object of 
controversies. According to the textbook analysis of the labour market, local 
unemployment may result from asymmetric shocks affecting the demand or the supply 
of labour and from wages failing to adjust to the market clearing level. In this context, 
the relationship between wage and unemployment is a temporary phenomenon 
characterising the adjustment process in the labour market. Alternatively, when 
reference is made to those theories in which the existence of imperfect competition on 
either product or labour markets (or both) is assumed, unemployment may well be 
considered as a key feature of the equilibrium. In other words, an “equilibrium” relation 
between wages and (local) unemployment might exist (Nickell et al., 1991; 
Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994a). 
A vast empirical literature has investigated the different hypotheses suggesting the 
existence of a relationship between wages and unemployment. Traditionally, empirical 
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studies have focused on the relation between the variation of wages and the level of 
unemployment. The existence of such a trade-off – the Phillips curve - is considered a 
well established feature of the functioning of labour markets as well as a tool for 
economic policy (Bean, 1994; Fabiani et al., 1997, Chiarini and Piselli, 1997). 
The focus of the present analysis, however, departs from the standard Phillips curve 
framework, in that it is assumed that there might be a long run “equilibrium” relation 
between the level of wages and the level of local unemployment. This relation, after the 
seminal work by Blanchflower and Oswald, is better known as the “wage curve” 
(Blanchflower and Oswald, 1990, 1994a, b).  
In the remainder of this section, we shall consider some possible theoretical 
explanations which may help to interpret the features of the wage curve in the Italian 
and German context for different groups of people.  
 
2.1. Compensating Differentials, Migration Flows, and Equilibrium 
According to the compensating differentials hypothesis, individuals living in areas 
characterised by some unpleasant attributes such as remoteness, high housing prices or 
high costs for local services, need to be adequately compensated for the disutility they 
incur by living and working there. In equilibrium, there is a pecuniary compensation 
associated to disadvantaged areas such that the expected utility is equalised across all 
the different locations2. 
When local unemployment is high, workers weigh the utility they get out of wages 
paid in the area by the probability of obtaining a job therein and move across areas 
responding to the different arbitrage conditions which characterise local wages and 
unemployment. Costless mobility occurs up to the point at which expected utility is 
equalised across areas. Note that people have always three different options if the 
unemployment in one region increases: some people might (temporarily) drop out of the 
labour force if they lose their job and the unemployment rate is generally rising 
(discouraged workers), some might move to a region where labour market conditions 
are better and still others might get unemployed and try to find a new job in the same 
region. In this context, the (long-run) spatial correlation between wages and 
                                                          
2  This idea goes back to the compensating differentials hypothesis by Adam Smith and to the more 
recent version proposed by Harris and Todaro (1970) in the context of developing countries. 
 5
unemployment across areas is positive: that is areas with high unemployment also 
feature higher wages. 
However, it has been argued that the hypothesis of costless mobility might be 
unrealistic and that the existence of fixed costs may well characterise the mobility 
decisions of individuals. In this case, a move across areas will be an optimal response 
only when “permanent” conditions vary (long run), while no move will be observed 
when conditions vary only “temporarily” (short run). Areas with different degrees of 
amenities will lie in different places along the equilibrium locus satisfying the local 
wage-unemployment trade-off (with individual wage w and regional unemployment U, 
compare Figure 1)3. 
 
(Figure 1 around here) 
 
In other words, when the hypothesis that location choices are made only at discrete 
intervals and that mobility costs in the short run are prohibitively high, then a (no 
mobility) equilibrium without migration flows across areas can be shown to exist even 
if there are differences in unemployment rates (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994a). 
It can be noted that while “permanent” labour market conditions - across areas - are 
not generally observed, the trade-off between “current” levels of wages and 
unemployment - within areas - can be easily investigated. The latter will be the main 
focus of the present study. 
Different hypotheses have been proposed in the literature to explain the co-variation 
(in equilibrium levels) of wages and unemployment. In terms of efficiency wage models 
low unemployment requires higher wages to deter workers’ shirking (Akerlof and 
Yellen, 1990; Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) and to reduce labour turnover (Salop, 1979). 
Alternatively, when wages are determined through collective bargaining, the 
unemployment rate plays the role of moderating trade unions wage aspirations: the 
higher the number of jobless individuals the lower the bargaining power of unions 
(Nickell and Wadhwani, 1990). The main result, in terms of wage-unemployment 
                                                          
3 For example, assume the existence of two areas, one more appealing than the other one for the 
presence of a higher degree of “amenities”. In order to be in the long run “no migration equilibrium”, the 
first area will present lower wages and higher unemployment as opposed to the other. Otherwise the more 
appealing area would be completely inhabited. Therefore the two areas, even sharing the same trade-off 
between wage and unemployment, will take, ceteris paribus, different positions on the curve: on the top 
left for less pleasant areas, on the bottom right for more appealing ones.   
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equilibria, is that (local) unemployment and the level of wages, within each area, are 
negatively correlated. 
Note that a negative relationship between “current” levels of wages and 
unemployment is not necessarily in contradiction with the concept of compensating 
differentials and with the idea that - ceteris paribus - “permanent” levels of wages 
might be positively correlated (in the long run) to unemployment rates across areas. 
While the former describes deviations of unemployment and wages from the permanent 
features which characterise each area, the latter describes an equilibrium of such 
permanent features across different areas.  
 
2.2 Heterogeneous Reactions to Changes in Unemployment 
Changes in unemployment and wages may affect the participation and the migration 
decision of workers differently. A well-researched difference is the labour supply 
decision of men and women. In addition, there might be differences between workers at 
a different position in the wage distribution. Finally, there might be institutional 
differences in the functioning of (regional) labour markets. We discuss the arguments in 
turn and derive some hypotheses for our countries under consideration. 
Female labour participation usually reacts stronger during the business cycle than male 
labour participation (Killingsworth, 1983). In addition, women frequently follow males 
in their regional choices of jobs (Faggio and Nickell, 2005). Both effects might lead to a 
smaller correlation between regional unemployment and female wages (in comparison 
to male wages) because the female labour market clears on the labour supply side 
without strong wage impulses. Participation decisions may also be affected by both 
institutional and cultural factors, with strong differences across regions within a 
country. This is particularly relevant in the two countries of our analysis. In East 
Germany before re-unification, employment played a central role in social life. Female 
participation rates were exceptionally high because the state provided a powerful 
system of day care for children and stimulated the quick return of mothers to their 
workplaces (Sinn and Sinn, 1991). It can therefore be expected that at least for the 
generation of those who worked already before institutional changes in 1991 took place, 
labour market participation is comparably high. In addition, relatively cheap housing 
and local services make it rather expensive for many to move from East Germany to 
other regions with higher wages and better labour market prospects. On the other hand, 
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in the South of Italy the labour market attachment - especially of females - is low and 
highly reactive to the strength of the labour market. The lower attachment of women in 
the South of Italy may be explained both by cultural reasons and by the lack of job 
opportunities – they prefer not to participate to take care of their family and/or to 
increase the probability of their husband to find/hold a job. The relatively high 
attachment of men in the South may then be explained by the fact that they are likely to 
be the only worker in the household, hence they need to stay in the labour market to 
sustain the family.  
Changes in local unemployment may also produce different effects along the 
wage distribution. Employees at the lower end of the wage distribution rather leave the 
labour market than accept lower wages if unemployment increases. This phenomenon is 
especially prominent in Germany and Italy because the replacement ratio of 
unemployment or social benefits is rather high for lower wage groups. This means that 
the correlation between unemployment and wages should be weak for low wage 
quantiles. An additional argument for a smaller elasticity between regional 
unemployment changes and wages for people at the lower end of the wage distribution 
is that economy-wide or industry collective contracts are usually binding for low paid 
workers, while for employees at the high end of the wage distribution individual or 
enterprise specific contracts are more widespread (Büttner and Fitzenberger, 1998). 
This aspect seems particularly relevant in the case of Italy, where wages are mainly set 
at the industry level and, despite recent reforms in the wage bargaining system, a 
marginal role is still played by local bargaining aimed at redistributing productivity 
gains, mainly in small and Southern firms (Casadio et al., 2005)4. Another argument for 
a higher wage elasticity for employees at higher quantiles of the wage curve is the 
shirking model presented by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994a). If shirking by 
employees at the high end of the wage distribution incurs higher losses for firms, one 
might observe a stronger elasticity of the wage curve for this group of employees. 
Nonetheless, the effect of changes in local unemployment at the high end of the wage 
distribution is less clear and probably asymmetric. These employees should in fact see 
their bargaining power increase stronger than that of employees at the lower end if 
unemployment decreases. On the other hand, employees at the high end of the wage 
distribution are regionally more mobile and therefore can avoid wage cuts during 
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regional recessions. In the middle of the wage distribution it is more costly (than for low 
paid workers) to withdraw from the labour market if wages decline during a recession, 
while it may not be worth it to move to a different region (compared with employees in 
the high part of the wage distribution). We therefore assume that the wage curve is 
strongest for the middle wage quantiles. 
Other institutional differences may play a crucial role in influencing the relation 
between local unemployment and local wages. More specifically, strict labour and 
product market regulation could induce some firms to operate in the underground 
economy, where part of the adjustment can take place when local labour market 
conditions change. In other words, when local unemployment increases some workers 
may find a (presumably lower paid) job in the irregular sector, thus leaving wages in the 
formal sector virtually unchanged. More in general, wages in the underground economy 
may be more sensitive to local labour market conditions than in the formal sector, 
mainly when the wage bargaining system does not allow for significant wage cuts. 
Furthermore, a different incidence of the underground economy across regions may 
explain why the wage curve is more evident in some areas than in other (namely, in 
those where the underground economy is less relevant). The effect of the underground 
economy on the wage curve may be particularly important in (the South of) Italy, which 
is among the OECD countries characterized by the highest incidence of the 
underground economy (Lucifora, 2003). 
Our theoretical considerations suggest that there should be different wage curves for 
different groups and regions. In the next parts we will demonstrate that indeed the 
correlation between wages and regional unemployment differs strongly between 
different groups of the population. 
 
3 The Institutional Setting in Germany and Italy 
Germany 
In Germany the largest regional differences on the labour market are observed between 
the former East German states (Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony-Anhalt, 
Brandenburg, Berlin, Thuringia, and Saxony) and the West German states. Also in West 
Germany there are persistent regional differences, but they are relatively small in 
                                                                                                                                                                          
4 For further details, see section 4 on Italy. 
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comparison to the East-West divide (OECD, 2000). The persistent differences between 
East and West Germany are related to several institutional decisions during the re-
unification process in 1989 and 1990 (Sinn and Sinn, 1991). After re-unification the 
closing of the wage gap was more rapid than the improvements in labour productivity in 
East Germany. This made production in traditional firms too costly (piece rates are 
currently still almost 10% higher in the East on average) and led to a massive de-
industrialisation. Mainly subsidiaries of West German or international enterprises with 
established brands (and their related market and price setting power), experience in 
marketing and export survived the first half of the nineties. The main problem of start-
ups by local entrepreneurs was a lack of capital. The massive structural break incurred 
by the bankruptcy of most of the traditional firms and relatively low investments from 
West Germany and abroad led to a high and persistent unemployment.  
Usually two arguments are raised for the rapid wage increases in East Germany. 
First, unions and politicians argued that without comparable wages in both parts of the 
country, there would be brain-drain and a dramatic migration from the East to the West. 
In addition, several commentators predicted the creation of a “German Mezzogiorno” if 
the living conditions would not converge quickly. In addition, wages and social benefits 
were seen as crucial parts of the living conditions that should be comparable in all 
regions of Germany by the constitution. Second, West German firms had no interest in a 
low-cost competition with comparable institutional rules and infrastructure within the 
own economy.  
In addition to the relatively low labour demand, incentives to look for a new job from 
unemployment are lower in East Germany than in the West because the relatively 
generous West German social benefits system was almost fully transferred to the 
Eastern part of the country, while productivity, labour demand and living costs are 
lower.  
The consequences are that investments and economic growth in East Germany are 
lower than in West Germany since 1995 and unemployment is persistently higher. 
Migration from East to West Germany is confined to young and relatively well-
educated people and this reduces the attractiveness of the labour force in the East. 
Productivity is still only 70% of the level in West Germany. The net transfers of more 
than 80 billion € per year from West to East are mainly spent for consumption and 
welfare benefits instead of investments. The topical propositions to improve the 
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situation do not promise a quick fix of the problems, but they could at least reduce the 
East-West divide somewhat.5 
 
Italy 
In Italy the debate on the existence of significant differences in local labour market 
conditions has a long standing tradition and has been associated with a long sequence of 
policy measures and “special” regimes. In particular, the latter have regarded the more 
disadvantaged areas of the country (mainly located in the Southern regions), the so-
called “Mezzogiorno”. The main policies implemented in recent decades were aimed at 
promoting faster convergence in income levels across areas, through national collective 
bargaining and (after 1968) through the abolition of the so-called “gabbie salariali” 
(which were used to set wage differences in collective negotiations across areas). At the 
same time, faced with increasing gaps in productivity levels and a different degree of 
competitiveness between Northern and Southern regions, a substantial flow of transfers 
and subsidies (mainly in the form of cuts in social security contributions) was directed 
towards firms operating in the more depressed areas. In the political arena the focus has 
been placed on the rigidities emerging from these institutional arrangements and, in 
particular, on the constraints imposed on the functioning of local labour markets (in 
terms of distortions of both relative factor prices and competitiveness with respect to 
local economic conditions). 
The empirical evidence also shows a progressive polarisation of labour market 
conditions in different areas of the country (the North-South divide) over the last 
decades, characterized by growing unemployment differentials and the reduction in 
(internal) migration flows - from the South to the North of Italy (Attanasio and 
Schioppa, 1992). In a number of previous studies, the relationship between wages and 
unemployment was rather weak, with significant differences existing between small and 
large firms and between Northern and Southern regions (Bodo and Sestito, 1994; Faini, 
1995; Casavola et al., 1995; Maida et al., 2005). 
                                                          
5 First, it is proposed to reduce regulations and over generous social benefits. Second, subsidies 
should be concentrated on regions and sectors with the highest future potential such as the automotive 
industry and the high technology sector in the regions of the cities of Dresden and Leipzig. Third, 
workfare programmes such as the so-called “Magdeburger Alternative” should push unemployed into 
low-paid jobs at the level of regional productivity with additional public transfers in order to secure a 
decent standard of living. 
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In the early Nineties a significant wave of reforms (i.e. elimination of the wage 
indexation mechanism - the scala mobile - and seniority premia; the tripartite incomes 
policy agreement in July 1993) were introduced to allow both employment and wages to 
be more flexible and reactive to productivity and business conditions. In particular, the 
1993 Income Agreement introduced a two-tier bargaining system (instead of the 
previous fragmented and uncoordinated system) aimed at preserving the purchasing 
power of wages without creating inflation pressure. Wages are in fact bargained at the 
industry level, taking into account inflation targets set by the Government. Further 
productivity gains can than be redistributed through additional wage bargaining at the 
local/company level, mainly through performance related pay schemes.  
Together with the progressive reduction of public transfers and subsidies to firms 
operating in the South, these reforms may have contributed to make wages more 
sensitive to local labour market conditions, although this was not their main objective 
(Dell’Aringa et al., 2005). 
Further contractual flexibility introduced by recent labour market reforms (such as 
temporary help employment with the so called “Treu Package” in 1997 and other forms 
of temporary contracts – including staff leasing, job sharing and on call jobs – with the 
“Biagi law” in 2003) should also produce similar effects (i.e., a closer link between 
wages and unemployment) at the local level. 
 
4 Some Stylised Facts 
In this section some stylised facts concerning the functioning of local labour markets in 
Germany and Italy are presented. We pay specific attention to the evolution of wages, 
labour market participation, and unemployment differentials between Northern and 
Southern regions in Italy, as well as Western and Eastern regions in Germany.  
A caveat, already mentioned at the end of section 2 and particularly relevant in the 
Italian case, is related to the presence of a large share of the labour force employed in 
the underground economy. Whilst the effective size of this non-regular form of 
employment is not known, its effect on the functioning of local labour markets might be 
relevant. This is an obvious limit in any analysis of the wage-unemployment 
relationship which the present study shares with previous work and which should be 
born in mind in the interpretation of the results. 
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In both Italy and Germany, unemployment rates show considerable differences 
across regions. Besides the traditional divide between unemployment rates in the North 
of Italy (3-8%) and the South of Italy (about 15-20%), and Western Germany (6-12%) 
and Eastern Germany (14-21%), there are noticeable differences also among 
neighbouring regions. Those differences underline the existence of a very low 
geographical worker mobility and exhibit a significant persistence over time (Faini et 
al., 1996).  
Figures 2a-2c depict the evolution of regional unemployment rates in Italy (1991-
2004) and Germany (1995-2000). More specifically, in Figure 2a each point represents 
a specific region, whose coordinates are given by its unemployment rate differential 
(with respect to the corresponding national average) at the beginning and the end of the 
period considered. The Figure clearly shows the above mentioned North-South and 
West-East divides: all Italian Northern regions and German Western regions (with the 
exception of Bremen) are characterized by unemployment rates below the national 
average in both years, while the opposite is true for the regions in the South of Italy and 
East of Germany. In Italy, despite the relative improvement of labour market 
performance in Southern regions in the late 1990s and early 2000s, differences among 
regions are still wide and very persistent, with a very stable regions’ ranking over time. 
The same emerges in the case of Germany, where differences are less relevant than in 
Italy but still growing over the period considered. These trends are confirmed 
considering every year in the entire period (see Figure 2b for Italy and Figure 2c for 
Germany). 
 
(Figures 2a-2c around here) 
 
In the previous sections we have already noted that there might be large and persistent 
differences in the labour market attachment between Italy and Germany and especially 
between the two economically weaker parts of the countries, South Italy and East 
Germany. Indeed we find a relatively high labour market participation in East Germany, 
regardless of the higher relative unemployment rates, while the situation is quite the 
contrary in South Italy (see fig. 3). In both countries, male and female participation 
rates are highly correlated: a region with a high male participation rate usually also 
exhibits a high female participation rate. In East Germany female labour participation is 
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higher than in all West German regions, while male labour participation is comparable 
in both parts of the country.  
If we regress6 regional participation on regional unemployment controlling for 
region and year, we find a negative and significant correlation in Germany. This is 
mainly driven by regions in the West. In East Germany the correlation is positive (and 
significant for females). In Italy there is only a positive and significant correlation for 
males in the South, all other correlations are insignificant. From these stylised facts we 
may conclude that people in East Germany (and here especially females) do not react by 
a withdrawal from the labour market in a depression but still try to get a job. In West 
Germany the discouraged worker effect seems to be strong, however. In Italy 
participation seems to be correlated with (local) job opportunities: where the 
unemployment rate is higher, job opportunities are lower and people have a lower 
incentive to participate. Only males in the South deviate from this pattern: even if 
unemployment increases, their labour market participation remains high. Participation is 
then an important piece in explaining the functioning of (local) labour markets; the 
differences in labour market attachment between Italy and Germany provide us with a 
useful variation that allows us to cast additional light on the following econometric 
results. 
 
(Figure 3 around here) 
 
Turning to wages, Figure 4 reports the structure and the evolution of regional wage 
differentials in Italy (1991-2004) and Germany (1996-2000). Wage differentials have 
been computed as deviations of regional wages from national averages, once again at 
the beginning and at the end of the period considered. The scattered diagrams indicate 
that the structure of wage differentials is much more stable but more dispersed in 
Germany than in Italy.  
In general, most Northern Italian regions pay higher wages than the national average, 
but relatively high wages are registered at least in one of the years considered also in 
some Southern regions (such as Calabria and Sardegna). Over time no clear-cut trends 
                                                          
6 These regressions are not shown here. They include 76 observations in Italy (19 regions times 4 
years) and 128 observations in Germany (16 regions times 8 years). For descriptive purposes, we simply 
regress (using OLS) regional participation on time dummies, region dummies and the regional 
unemployment rate. 
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seem to emerge (since both some Northern and Southern regions have been improving 
their relative position), even if for most of the South (mainly Campania, Molise, Puglia 
and Sicilia) wage differentials have been widening in the last decade. 
In Germany wage levels were more than 15% lower than the national average in the 
Eastern parts and there was almost no cohesion process between 1996 and 2000. The 
only exception is the federal capital Berlin. Its former western part belongs to the 
western collective bargaining area. This is important because most wages belong or at 
least are oriented at the collective bargaining accord struck separately for different 
regions. While it was originally planned to increase the Eastern collectively bargained 
wages quickly to the Western level, still Eastern contractual wages are lower than 
Western ones (albeit higher than the relative productivity in most firms in East 
Germany). In addition, a much higher share of establishments does not take part in 
collective bargaining in the East and pays wages lower than the bargained wage or opts 
out of paying the full wage on the basis of an acute economic emergency. 
 
(Figure 4 around here) 
 
At this point it would be interesting to study more closely the relationship between 
wages and unemployment at the local level. One obvious feature of the previous 
analysis is that some “permanent” characteristics appear to shape the long term structure 
of both wages and unemployment levels across areas. However, when the focus is 
placed on flexibility issues and on the ability of local labour markets to adjust to 
specific shocks, then what is really necessary for the identification of the wage curve is 
how variations in current unemployment are related to variations in current wages 
across areas. In other words, for the correct determination of wage curves it is important 
to purge the analysis from the long term features (observable and unobservable) that 
characterise local labour markets such as the quality of the infrastructure, amenities, the 
costs of living or the emergence of industry clusters and specific economic 
characteristics of regions (the so-called “fixed or permanent effects”). 
As a first approximation for the wage curves presented in the next section, in Figure 
5 we plot first differences in regional wages and unemployment. On inspection of the 
cloud of points in the diagram, no clear cut negative relationship – as implied by the 
theoretical framework - between unemployment and wages appears in either country. In 
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addition, first differences of wages are much more heterogeneous in Italy than in 
Germany (probably also due to the longer time span considered). 
 
(Figure 5 around here) 
 
 
5 Empirical Analysis 
In the empirical literature the wage curve has often been specified (and estimated) as a 
reduced form assuming the (local) unemployment variable as exogenous. However, if 
the wage curve is interpreted as a structural relation, it is necessary to introduce some 
assumptions concerning how the market equilibrium is determined: namely, a relation 
written either in terms of a price equation or of a labour demand curve is necessary.  
The model can be written as follows: 
 
 
 wj = φ[ƒ(Uj ), ρi| Xj ]        [1]  
 Uj = ϕ(wj, ρi, σj| Zj )        [2] 
 Ε(Γj ) = Γ *          [3] 
 
where j indexes the area (ρ), w is the wage level, U the local unemployment, σ a 
demand shock, and X and Z are two vectors of control variables (i.e. respectively for the 
wage curve [1] and the price/labour demand curve [2]). The model is closed by the “no-
migration condition” according to which, in equilibrium, expected utility should be 
equalised across areas. 
The identification of equation [1] can be obtained either by assuming that only 
variations in σ occur (i.e. idiosyncratic shocks affect only the demand), or using 
Instrumental Variables techniques to instrument local unemployment7. A further option 
is to consider a recursive model, in which wage levels only depend on past 
unemployment. 
                                                          
7 Note that less than 10% of the studies on wage curves use instrumental variables to control for 
endogeneity of the unemployment rate and employ OLS as the estimation technique instead (Nijkamp 
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Empirical estimates of the wage curve are usually based on highly disaggregated 
data, in order to control for the heterogeneity present in local labour markets both in 
terms of workers’ (i.e. age, education, work experience, etc.) and firms’ characteristics 
(i.e. size, level of unionisation, profitability, sector etc.). However, the unemployment 
rate is usually referred to the area where individuals work (or firms are located). The 
use of variables at different levels of disaggregation may lead to biased estimates if all 
the individuals who work in the same region share some common factors. More 
precisely, the estimates of the more aggregated variable (i.e., the unemployment rate) 
present lower standard errors. From a statistical point of view, this can overestimate the 
importance of local unemployment in influencing individual wages. 
To tackle the problem there are a number of options available. First, estimates can be 
obtained using cell means (conditional or not on a given set of characteristics) for the 
more disaggregated variable, where the actual degrees of freedom are determined by the 
more aggregated variable. Second, a “two stage” procedure has been proposed by 
Moulton (1986, 1990). In the first step, estimates of area wage differentials (using 
regional or provincial dummies) conditional on a given set of individual and firms’ 
characteristics are obtained for each period. In the second step, the estimated wage 
differentials are regressed against local unemployment as well as both time and area 
fixed effects. This model is estimated using standard errors from first stage regression 
as weights8. 
 
5.1. An Econometric Specification for the Wage Curve 
The specification adopted in most empirical studies of the wage curve is as follows: 
 
 wijt = ρi  + τt  + φƒ(Ujt,) +β´Xijt  + εijt     [4] 
 
where wijt is the (log) wage paid to individual i in the region j at time t; f(Uit) is a 
non-linear transformation of the local unemployment rate; ρi and τi are, respectively, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
and Poot, 2005). 
8 Equation [3] assumes that mobility flows are equal to zero and that there is no spatial correlation 
between areas (i.e., cov (wk, wh)=0 if k≠h, where k and h are regions) (Anselin, 1988). However, the 
existence of spill-over effects between areas close to each other cannot be excluded a priori. We tried to 
assess spill-over effects by taking out migrants between regions from the sample in Germany. The results 
did not change, however, compare Ammermüller et al. (2006). 
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area and time fixed effects, while Xijt is a vector of additional factors that may influence 
wages; finally, φ and β are the parameters to be estimated and εijt is the error term. 
Equation [4] assumes the existence of a long run equilibrium relation between wage 
levels and local unemployment rates. The expected sign of this relationship - as 
discussed in a previous section - is negative (φ < 0). However, if there is some inertia in 
the adjustment process a re-parameterisation of [4] - as in equation [5] below - might be 
preferable: 
 
 Δwijt = ρi  + τt  + γ1ƒ(Ujt-1,) +  γ2Δƒ(Ujt,) - αwijt-1  + β´Xijt  + εijt  [5] 
In the above specification the long run equilibrium – between the level of wages and 
the level of local unemployment - is embodied in an Error Correction Mechanism 
(ECM).  
Furthermore, some interesting assumptions can be tested. When |α|≈1 and γ1=γ2, 
equation [5] reduces to [4]. Also, if α≈0 the relationship becomes a more traditional 
augmented Phillips curve; alternatively, when 0<|α|<1 we get a more standard partial 
adjustment wage equation9.  
The coefficient α measures the stickiness of wages to variations of the local 
unemployment rate: the closer α is to unity (in absolute value), the faster is the 
adjustment of wages to variations in local unemployment.  
It is worth stressing, however, that obtaining unbiased estimates of α can be 
problematic. Blanchard and Katz (1997) show how inappropriate wage measures (for 
example, a measure influenced by the number of days worked, such as average annual 
earnings) or the presence of sampling errors can lead to an upward biased estimate of 
that coefficient10. An important reason for the inappropriateness of annual earnings is 
that working hours tend to decline in depressions (Card, 1995). Nevertheless, most 
empirical estimations of the wage curve are on the basis of annual or monthly data 
(Nijkamp and Poot, 2005). We demonstrate the size of this effect by using both hourly 
and monthly wages. 
 
                                                          
9 In this case the long run elasticity of wages to local unemployment is ηw,U = γ1/a. 
10 This kind of bias can be avoided paying particular attention to the measure of wage levels adopted 
in the empirical analysis: one effective way is to control for the number of hours/days worked (for 
example, using hourly earnings instead of annual ones). 
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5.2. Data  
In the empirical analysis for each country we use a matched data set obtained by 
merging – at the regional level - individual records on wages, personal and firm 
characteristics as well as geographical location with unemployment rates and other local 
labour market features reported in the Labour Force Survey (LFS). Given the aim of our 
analysis, we restrict our sample to non-agricultural employees working in the private 
sector, thus excluding self-employed and public sector employees. 
In the case of Italy, we use micro-data from different waves of the Bank of Italy’s 
Survey on Households Income and Wealth (SHIW), focusing our attention on the last 
decade11. Detailed information on personal and job characteristics of a representative 
sample of around 4000 private employees (for each wave) is available. Personal 
characteristics include gender, age, years of education and marital status, while job 
characteristics include economic sector, years of work experience, tenure, occupation 
(blue collars, white collars and managers), type of contract (whether full or part-time) 
and number of hours worked. Individuals are located according to their administrative 
region of residence (19 regions), covering the entire national territory12.The survey 
provides direct information on annual net wages, number of months worked and usual 
weekly hours (including overtime): on the basis of this information, both hourly and 
monthly wages could be retrieved. 
Regional unemployment rates and other local labour market indicators are derived 
from the Labour Force Survey, as they are periodically published by the National 
Statistics Office (Istat). 
For Germany, our main data source is the German Microcensus (MC). The 
microcensus is the official representative statistic of the population and the labour 
market, involving 1% of all households in Germany every year. The total number of 
households participating in the microcensus is about 370,000 (encompassing 820,000 
persons), including about 70,000 households (about 160,000 persons) in the new Länder 
and the eastern part of Berlin. All households have the same probability of selection for 
the microcensus. Within the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, sampling 
                                                          
11  Since the survey is usually run every two years, we used the 1991, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002 
and 2004 surveys.  
12 Italy is actually divided into 20 administrative regions, characterized by quite different size. Given 
the relatively low number of observations in SHIW for the smallest regions (less than 50 observations per 
year), the empirical analysis was based on 19 regions, with Valle d’Aosta aggregated with Piemonte. 
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districts are selected in which all households and persons are interviewed. Every year, a 
quarter of all households included in the sample are replaced. This means that every 
household stays in the sample for four years. Household numbers are not included in the 
Scientific Use File. Hence, the microcensus cannot be used as a panel. 
The annual standard programme of the microcensus includes characteristics on 
persons (age, sex, citizenship, etc.), the family and household context. In addition, we 
know the main and the secondary place of residence, whether the individual is 
employed, on job search, unemployed or out of the labour force. There is information 
on the number of children at pre-primary age, pupils, students in the household and 
information on individual general and vocational level of qualification and on the level 
of the individual and household net incomes. The microcensus is the data set which is 
most adequate for our research purpose because it combines two advantages: a huge 
sample size and a large number of covariates on the individual level. The following 
variables from the microcensus are used in our estimations: net income13, working time, 
qualification, job tenure, federal state (Land) the individual lives in, and personal 
characteristics (age and gender). 
Besides the microcensus, we use the INKAR (an acronym for indicators and maps of 
regional development) database and data provided by the German Federal Statistical 
Office. The INKAR database is published yearly by the Federal Office for Building and 
Regional Planning in co-operation with the Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical 
Offices of the German states (Länder). It regularly and topically describes the situation 
of the regional development in Germany and Europe. It includes about 20 indicators on 
topics such as age and population structure, employment or unemployment. From the 
INKAR database, the variable “average yearly unemployment rate on state-level” is 
used. 
For both Italy and Germany, we derive hourly income by dividing net income by 
working time.14 We construct the variable “years of education” by using the information 
on the highest degree of schooling and professional education, taking the standard 
                                                          
13 In micro-data for Germany net income is given in intervals. We take midpoints of the categories. 
The problem of earnings information given in categories is less severe than it first seems. First, categories 
are quite small (e.g. 24 income categories). Second, individuals usually don't know exactly the monthly 
income and therefore, measurement error should not be much higher than in other data sets. 
14 For Germany we restrict hourly earnings to a maximum of 154 € and a minimum of 1.02 €. The 
upper limit affects only very few observations due to the categorical income variable and the lower limit 
affects less than 0.5 percent of the sample. 
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lengths of all primary, secondary, and tertiary qualifications and add them up 
accordingly for each person. The variable “labour market experience” is constructed by 
subtracting the years of education plus six from age. Hence, we actually use a proxy for 
potential labour market experience15. 
 
6 Results 
The main objective of our paper is to demonstrate that certain groups of employees 
react differently from others to changes in regional unemployment and therefore wage 
curves differ between groups. In addition we show that wage curves are quite sensitive 
with respect to the estimation technique chosen.  
Table 1 presents some estimates of the wage curve for Italy (first panel) and 
Germany (second panel) using different estimation techniques. The dependent variable 
used to obtain the estimates reported in Table 1 is derived from area fixed effects (i.e. 
conditional mean hourly earnings at the regional level) computed in a first stage 
regression in which, for each year, controls for individual characteristics were also 
included16. 
In models 1 and 2 we report estimates obtained by fitting the traditional specification 
of the wage curve – as described in equation [4] – while in the remaining models we 
report estimates of the ECM specification of equation [5] with the dependent variable in 
first differences and a lagged term on the right-hand-side17.  
In models 1 and 3 we assess the extent of the potential bias due to the omission of 
regional fixed effects on the estimate of the elasticity of local unemployment; the latter 
are included in the remaining models. In models 4 and 6, the change in local 
unemployment is added18. It is worth noting that in model 4 the current unemployment 
rate is used instead of the lagged one. Finally, given the potential simultaneity between 
wages and local unemployment, in the last model we use an Instrumental Variables (IV) 
estimator. 
 
                                                          
15 In the Italian data-set we have also a direct measure of work experience. Using the latter instead of 
potential experience does not significantly change our main results.  
16 More specifically, we control for gender, education, experience and tenure. 
17 It is important to stress that the re-parameterisation of equation [4], given the presence of a lagged 
dependent variable on the right-hand-side, still implies that the equation is in levels – as the theory of the 
wage curve suggests – and that the error term is not altered by the transformation. 
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(Tables 1a and 1b around here) 
 
In general, results show no evidence for a statistically significant negative 
relationship linking unemployment rates to wages at a regional level in Italy. Only those 
specifications without regional fixed effects have a spurious negative correlation This 
confirms the results by Canziani (1997) and Lucifora and Origo (1999). Using a 
different data set, a different definition of wages (weekly gross wages) and focusing on 
a different time period (1985-1999) Devicienti et al. (2006) have recently found some 
evidence of a wage curve in Italy, while the estimated elasticity is rather small (less than 
0.03 in absolute value). 
In Germany results are quite sensitive to our model specification: while no evidence 
for a wage curve seems to emerge from the traditional specification in levels, ECM re-
parameterisation points out the existence of a (weakly) significant negative effect of 
local unemployment on wages, even if the size of the effect is much smaller than what 
the mainstream empirical evidence predicts (in absolute value, the long run elasticity is 
around 0.06, lower than the “empirical rule” of 0.1 proposed by Blanchflower and 
Oswald, 1994a). We get a slightly stronger (weaker) impact of regional unemployment 
on wages in Italy (Germany) if we use monthly instead of hourly wages (Table 1b). At 
least for Germany, this can explain why previous studies using monthly earnings find 
more evidence in support of a wage curve. The differences in the estimated wage curves 
are for both countries smaller than those shown by Card (1995) for US data. If we 
compare the results of model (7) with those of model (6) we see that exogenising the 
contemporary unemployment rate using the lagged unemployment rate as instruments 
does not change the results. One possible explanation is that the changes in regional 
unemployment from year to year might be so small that we do not gain a lot of 
additional information by this procedure. 
Focusing on the dynamics of wages, it is shown that the coefficient α on the lagged 
dependent variable is generally significantly different from both 0 and 1, suggesting that 
there might be substantial inertia in the adjustment process of wages.  
In a next step we empirically estimate if our theoretical hypotheses on different wage 
curves for certain sub-groups on the labour market are supported. Table 2 presents the 
main results for different sub-groups of our samples, paying specific attention to the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
18 In column 6, the specification reported in equation [5] is estimated.  
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role of gender and education19. Even after disaggregating the sample, we were unable to 
detect any statistically significant relationship between wages and local unemployment 
in Italy for the sub-groups considered. Only the low educated in Italy have a positive 
and slightly significant correlation.  
In Germany, the situation is quite different. Here mainly the females, people in East 
Germany and the low educated exhibit a significantly negative wage curve. This is in 
accordance with the results for the different groups by Baltagi and Blien (1998) for 
West Germany and Baltagi et al., (2000) for East Germany.20 In the meta-analysis by 
Nijkamp and Poot (2005) also a higher wage elasticity is found for East Germany than 
for West Germany. 
It is especially stunning that in South Italy the correlation is positive (albeit 
insignificant) while it is significantly negative for males and females in East Germany. 
We interpret these results as follows: In South Italy, increases in the (local) 
unemployment rate - whilst having a negligible effect on wage levels - significantly 
increase the flow of discouraged workers, mainly of the low paid ones, out of the labour 
market. In East Germany, labour attachment is traditionally high, however, and most 
people still want to participate even when their chances to find a job decrease. This 
leads to a strong pressure on wages when unemployment rises. 
 
(Tables 2a and 2b around here) 
 
We also tested whether the reaction of wages to local unemployment varies along the 
wage distribution. In Table 3 we present estimates of the wage curve based on first-step 
quantile regressions in correspondence with the relevant deciles of the wage distribution 
in both Italy and Germany21. Reported estimates refer to the usual wage curve 
specification, both without and with regional fixed effects (model 1 and 2 in Table 1), 
and to the ECM re-parameterisation (model 6 in Table 1). 
                                                          
19 We estimated the wage curve also for different age groups. Results are similar to those obtained at 
the aggregate level. Estimates are available upon request. 
20 Their results also differ strongly depending on the estimation approach. They use different data sets 
with a much finer regional classification, different time periods, and a slightly different estimation 
approach always aggregating wages and individual characteristics on the regional level instead of 
estimating individual wage regressions in the first step. 
21 More specifically, the dependent variable of the second stage is now made of the regional fixed 
effects obtained from the first step quantile regressions on individual micro-data, in which for each decile 
we controlled for the same worker characteristics used in the previous OLS estimates. 
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According to our hypotheses, results for both Italy and Germany show some 
evidence in favour of a stronger wage curve relationship for the middle part of the wage 
distribution, but also in this case our conclusions depend on the model specification 
adopted. In the case of Italy, with the ECM specification we obtain a significant 
negative relation between regional unemployment and wages at the median and at the 
6th decile, while the effect of unemployment is significantly positive for the lowest 
decile. This pattern is mainly driven by the males and the North (compare Tables 3b and 
3c) 
For Germany the relation between regional unemployment and wages is only 
significant for the fourth quantile and higher. This is also found by Büttner and 
Fitzenberger (1998). German males in the middle of the wage distribution do have 
higher significant correlations while for females also the extreme quartiles exhibit a 
sizeable negative correlation. While in West Germany comparably to Italy the wage 
curve is only measurable at the 5th and 6th quartile, there is a negative and significant 
effect for almost all quartiles in the East. 
  
(Table 3 around here) 
 
7 Concluding Remarks 
This study shows based on theoretical considerations that wage curves differ for 
different groups and countries. Despite the large gaps in unemployment rates among 
different areas (mainly between Northern and Southern regions in Italy and East and 
West in Germany), geographical wage differentials have remained relatively stable over 
time and fairly insulated from local labour market conditions. This suggests that the 
traditional negative relationship linking wage levels to local unemployment rates - the 
wage curve - does not appear yet to be a stylised fact for all employee groups in all 
OECD countries. Especially in the Italian labour market the relevant coefficients often 
show the wrong sign and they are in general not statistically significant. In the case of 
Germany, results are instead quite sensitive to the model specification and the group 
considered. We find that especially the labour market in East Germany, as well as 
females and the low educated encounter a relatively high wage elasticity to changes in 
regional unemployment. In both countries, the reaction of wages to local unemployment 
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varies significantly along the wage distribution, being more sensitive around the median 
quantiles. 
The data used reveal also the existence of inertia in the wage adjustment process: 
more specifically neither a wage curve, nor a Phillips curve specification seem to 
provide an adequate description of wage determination in both Italy and Germany. 
These results thus provide additional evidence which casts some doubts on studies 
based on either of the above specifications. 
Based on theoretical considerations we try to explain the differences between groups 
in the estimated wage curves. The structure of collective bargaining in Italy, where 
national agreements appear to be still effective in ensuring little dispersion in wage 
levels across areas may be a reason. Furthermore, if the large size of the informal sector 
in Italy is taken into account, then these findings might simply indicate that adjustment 
does not occur in the regular sector of the economy, but rather outside of it. This 
interpretation seems particularly suggestive, though the lack of detailed information on 
the informal sector makes it only tentative.  
In East Germany and for employees in the middle of the wage curve it might not be 
financially interesting to react to unemployment changes by migrating to other parts of 
the country or leaving the labour force. Therefore, wages react to changes in 
unemployment for these groups giving rise to a wage curve. 
Concluding, our estimations cast doubt on the applicability of a universal empirical 
law that the unemployment elasticity of pay is around -0.1 (Blanchflower and Oswald, 
1994a; Card, 1995). The striking likeness of hundreds of regressions on this subject 
may be based on the small variance in estimation techniques, publication bias, and a 
disregard of some basic econometric problems, such as the endogeneity of the 
unemployment variable, time lags in the transmission and data on wages that do not 
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Source: Istat (Italy), INKAR (Germany) 
Notes: For each year, per cent deviation of regional unemployment rate from national average (Regional U - National 
U), Rho = correlation coefficient, 
Key for Italian regions: ABR = Abruzzo, BAS = Basilicata, CAL = Calabria, CAM = Campania, ER = Emilia 
Romagna, FVG = Friuli Venezia Giulia, LAZ = Lazio, LIG= Liguria, LOM = Lombardia, MAR = Marche, MOL = 
Molise, PIE = Piemonte, PUG = Puglia, SAR = Sardegna, SIC = Sicilia, TAA = Trentino Alto Adige, TOS = 
Toscana, UMB = Umbria, VA = Valle d’Aosta, VEN = Veneto 
Key for German regions: BW = Baden-Wuerttemberg, BY = Bavaria, BE = Berlin, BB = Brandenburg, HB = 
Bremen, HH = Hamburg, HE = Hesse, NI = Lower Saxony, MV = Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, NW = North 
Rhine-Westphalia, RP = Rhineland-Palatinate, SL = Saarland, SN = Saxony, ST = Saxony-Anhalt, SH = Schleswig-
Holstein, TH = Thuringia. 
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Figure 2b: Evolution of regional and national unemployment in Italy: 1989-2004 
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Figure 2b (continued) 
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Figure 2b (continued) 
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Source: Own calculation on the basis of Istat data 
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Figure 2c: Evolution of regional and national unemployment in Germany: 1995-
2000 
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Figure 2c (continued) 
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Source: Own calculation on the basis of INKAR data 
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 Source: Bank of Italy 
For each year, difference between regional log wage and national average (Regional logw - National 
logw) 


































Source: Micro census 1996, 2000, own calculations 
Rho = correlation coefficient 
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Source: Bank of Italy and Istat 
Notes: each point is determined by annual variations of wage and unemployment in a given region 
 
 













Source: Statistisches Bundesamt; Micro census 1996 - 2000, own calculations 
Notes: each point is determined by annual variations of wage and unemployment in a given region 
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Table 1a: Estimates of the wage curve, non agricultural employees in private sector, hourly 
wages 
ITALY 
 GLS IV* 
 Dep var logWt Dep var: logWt-logWt-1 
 Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
logUt -0.096 0.097 -0.118 0.013   -0.005 
 (8.0) (2.2) (6.7) (0.2)   (0.1) 
logUt-1     -0.025 -0.005  
     (0.5) (0.1)  
DeltaU      0.030 0.036 
      (0.5) (0.7) 
logWt-1   -0.816 -1.252 -1.249 -1.259 -1.251 
   (6.7) (13.0) (13.1) (13.0) (13.0) 
Fixed effects       
time yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
regions no yes no yes yes yes yes 
N 133 133 114 114 114 114 114 
R2 0.749 0.828 0.806 0.864 0.864 0.864 0.864 
GERMANY 
 GLS IV* 
 Dep var: logWt Dep var: logWt-logWt-1 
 Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
logUt -0.332 -0.051 -0.016 -0.063   -0.062 
 (15.3) (1.3) (1.3) (1.8)   (1.7) 
logUt-1      -0.039 -0.062   
      (1.5) (1.7)   
DeltaU       -0.065 -0.003 
       (1.3) (0.08) 
logWt-1   -0.04 -0.235 -0.240 -0.235 -0.235 
   (1.4) (2.5) (2.5) (2.5) (2.5) 
Fixed effects       
time yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
regions no yes no yes yes yes yes 
N 128 128 112 112 112 112 112 
R2 0.823 0.977 0.923 0.941 0.940 0.941 0.941 
Note: periods for Italy, 1991-2004; for Germany 1996-2003, absolute t statistics based on robust s.e. are 
reported below each coefficient, dependent variable: regional fixed effects from a set of first step OLS 
regressions with individual micro-data (for each year, wage equations with controls for region, gender, 
years of educa-tion, experience, experience squared, tenure and tenure squared). 




Table 1b: Estimates of the wage curve, non agricultural employees in private sector, monthly 
earnings 
ITALY 
 GLS IV* 
 Dep var logWt Dep var: logWt-logWt-1 
 Model        
logUt -0.109 0.077 -0.097 -0.039   -0.027 
 (9.5) (1.9) (5.8) (0.8)   (0.5) 
logUt-1      0.003 -0.027   
      (0.1) (0.5)   
DeltaU       -0.052 -0.024 
       (0.9) (0.5) 
logWt-1   -0.512 -0.984 -0.975 -0.986 -0.986 
   (5.5) (8.9) (8.9) (8.9) (8.9) 
Fixed effects       
time yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
regions no yes no yes yes yes yes 
N 133 133 114 114 114 114 114 
R2 0.808 0.869 0.906 0.929 0.929 0.929 0.929 
GERMANY 
 GLS IV* 
 Dep var: logWt Dep var: logWt-logWt-1 
 Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
logUt -0.243 -0.016 -0.011 -0.039   -0.037 
 (16.8) (1.2) (2.5) (3.0)   (2.8) 
logUt-1      -0.015 -0.037   
      (1.6) (2.8)   
DeltaU       -0.059 -0.023 
       (2.5) (1.37) 
logWt-1   -0.056 -0.756 -0.741 -0.753 -0.753 
   (3.5) (6.7) (6.5) (6.7) (6.7) 
Fixed effects       
time yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
regions no yes no yes yes yes yes 
N 128 128 112 112 112 112 112 
R2 0.802 0.996 0.978 0.988 0.987 0.988 0.988 
Note: for Italy, 1991-2004; for Germany 1996-2003, absolute t statistics based on robust s.e. are reported 
below each coefficient, dependent variable: regional fixed effects from a set of first step OLS regressions 
with individual micro-data (for each year, wage equations with controls for region, gender, years of 
educa-tion, experience, experience squared, tenure and tenure squared). 
* U lags (Ut-1 and Ut-2) were used as instruments for Ut. 
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Table 2a: Estimates of the wage curve by groups: gender, education and region 
ITALY 
 Dep var: logWt-logWt-1 
  Males Females Low edu Mid edu High edu North South 
logUt-1 -0.009 0.034 0.126 -0.089 -0.075 -0.028 0.190 
 (0.2) (0.2) (1.7) (0.7) (0.4) (0.5) (1.0) 
DeltaU 0.025 0.197 0.137 -0.141 0.040 -0.031 0.181 
 (0.4) (1.3) (1.8) (1.2) (0.2) (0.6) (1.1) 
logWt-1 -1.182 -1.118 -1.216 -1.045 -1.015 -1.159 -1.312 
 (11.9) (9.4) (12.8) (9.5) (8.9) (9.0) (8.4) 
Fixed effects         
time yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
regions yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
N 114 114 114 114 114 66 48 
R2 0.916 0.602 0.854 0.414 0.522 0.913 0.946 
GERMANY 
 Dep var: logWt-logWt-1 
  Males Females Low edu Mid edu High edu West East 
logUt-1 -0.050 -0.103 -0.064 -0.047 -0.006 0.006 -0.309 
 (1.4) (2.3) (1.7) (0.8) (0.1) (0.1) (1.9) 
DeltaU -0.073 -0.057 -0.022 -0.149 -0.077 0.005 -0.170 
 (1.5) (0.9) (0.4) (1.8) (1.0) (0.1) (1.4) 
logWt-1 -0.229 -0.303 -0.203 -0.397 -0.771 -0.248 -0.256 
 (2.5) (3.0) (2.2) (3.8) (6.5) (1.7) (2.4) 
Fixed effects     
time yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
regions yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
N 112 112 112 112 112 70 42 
R2 0.95 0.846 0.887 0.750 0.996 0.940 0.933 
Note: for Italy, 1991-2004; for Germany 1996-2003, absolute t statistics based on robust s.e. are reported 
below each coefficient, dependent variable: regional fixed effects from a set of first step OLS regressions 
with individual micro-data (for each year, wage equations with controls for region, gender, years of 
educa-tion, experience, experience squared, tenure and tenure squared). 
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Table 2b: Estimates of the wage curve by groups: gender by region 
ITALY 
 Dep var: logWt-logWt-1 
 North South 
  Males Females Males Females 
logUt-1 -0.047 -0.018 0.131 0.258 
 (0.9) (0.2) (0.6) (0.7) 
DeltaU -0.037 -0.048 0.081 0.656 
 (0.7) (0.5) (0.4) (2.0) 
logWt-1 -0.954 -1.177 -1.459 -0.968 
 (8.3) (7.6) (9.4) (5.3) 
Fixed effects    
time yes yes yes yes
regions yes yes yes yes
N 66 66 48 48
R2 0.868 0.770 0.927 0.917
GERMANY 
 Dep var: logWt-logWt-1 
 West East 
  Males Females Males Females 
logUt-1 -0.068 0.081 -0.412 -0.378 
 (0.8) (0.7) (2.2) (1.7) 
DeltaU -0.033 -0.007 -0.282 -0.137 
 (0.3) (0.1) (2.0) (0.9) 
logWt-1 -0.280 -0.294 -0.295 -0.484 
 (1.8) (2.1) (2.1) (3.0) 
Fixed effects    
time yes yes yes yes
regions yes yes yes yes
N 70 70 42 42
R2 0.948 0.843 0.943 0.894
Note: for Italy, 1991-2004; for Germany 1996-2003, absolute t statistics based on robust s.e. are reported 
below each coefficient, dependent variable: regional fixed effects from a set of first step OLS regressions 
with individual micro-data (for each year, wage equations with controls for region, gender, years of 
educa-tion, experience, experience squared, tenure and tenure squared). 
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Table 3a: Estimates of the wage curve along the wage distribution 
ITALY 
 Dep var: logWt 
Deciles: 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Model without regional fixed effects      
logUt -0.216 -0.174 -0.137 -0.117 -0.097 -0.078 -0.065 -0.050 -0.034 
 (11.0) (12.5) (11.1) (10.5) (9.2) (7.8) (5.9) (4.4) (2.0) 
Model with fixed regional effects             
logUt 0.196 0.078 0.045 0.036 0.014 0.014 0.037 0.027 0.012 
  (2.7) (1.5) (1.0) (0.8) (0.4) (0.4) (0.9) (0.7) (0.2) 
 Dep var: logWt-logWt-1 
Error Correction Model        
logUt-1 0.241 0.055 -0.017 -0.050 -0.090 -0.093 -0.045 -0.059 -0.041 
 (2.3) (0.8) (0.3) (0.9) (1.8) (2.1) (0.8) (0.9) (0.4) 
DeltaU 0.223 0.050 0.000 -0.007 -0.030 -0.045 -0.023 -0.123 0.009 
 (2.3) (0.8) (0.0) (0.1) (0.6) (1.0) (0.4) (0.2) (0.1) 
logWt-1 -1.260 -1.151 -1.175 -1.098 -1.129 -1.125 -1.127 -1.050 -1.337 
 (13.9) (13.2) (13.4) (11.8) (11.4) (11.9) (11.6) (9.1) (9.9) 
ηw,U 0.191 0.048 -0.014 -0.046 -0.080 -0.083 -0.040 -0.056 -0.031 
GERMANY 
 Dep var: logWt 
Deciles: 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Model without regional fixed effects    
logUt -0.291 -0.305 -0.316 -0.321 -0.334 -0.339 -0.348 -0.360 -0.408 
 (16.1) (16.4) (16.3) (16.8) (16.7) (16.7) (17.0) (17.0) (15.5) 
Model with fixed regional effects         
logUt 0.021 0.006 0.028 -0.051 -0.030 -0.030 -0.035 -0.049 -0.115 
  (0.9) (0.4) (1.5) (4.3) (2.2) (1.9) (1.9) (2.0) (2.1) 
Error Correction Model        
logUt-1 -0.030 -0.014 -0.019 -0.056 -0.030 -0.047 -0.045 -0.069 -0.099 
 (1.4) (0.8) (1.3) (4.2) (2.3) (4.0) (3.1) (3.2) (1.8) 
DeltaU -0.013 -0.033 -0.006 -0.034 -0.030 -0.048 -0.037 -0.086 -0.116 
 (0.4) (1.2) (0.2) (2.2) (1.9) (2.7) (1.8) (3.0) (1.7) 
logWt-1 -0.592 -0.597 -0.439 -0.576 -0.429 -0.386 -0.481 -0.397 -0.257 
 (5.9) (5.3) (3.8) (6.0) (4.5) (5.3) (5.1) (4.6) (1.2) 
ηw.U -0.051 -0.023 -0.043 -0.097 -0.070 -0.122 -0.094 -0.174 -0.385 
Note: for Italy, 1991-2004; for Germany 1996-2003, absolute t statistics based on robust s.e. are reported 
below each coefficient, models specification as in Table 1, dependent variable: regional fixed effects 
from a set of first step quantile regressions with individual micro-data (for each year, wage equations 




Table 3b: Estimates of the wage curve along the wage distribution by gender, ITALY 
MALES 
 Dep var: logWt 
Deciles: 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Model without regional fixed effects      
logUt -0.202 -0.158 -0.137 -0.103 -0.087 -0.067 -0.043 -0.055 -0.034 
 (7.5) (10.9) (10.9) (9.6) (8.6) (6.6) (4.5) (4.7) (1.8) 
Model with fixed regional effects             
logUt 0.199 0.061 0.01 0.043 0.018 0.017 0.095 0.007 -0.002 
  (1.8) (1.1) (0.2) (1.0) (0.5) (0.4) (2.3) (0.2) (0.1) 
 Dep var: logWt-logWt-1 
Error Correction Model        
logUt-1 0.299 -0.008 -0.073 -0.053 -0.087 -0.116 -0.040 -0.090 -0.038 
 (1.8) (0.1) (1.1) (1.0) (1.7) (2.2) (0.7) (1.3) (0.4) 
DeltaU 0.272 0.008 -0.068 -0.037 -0.061 -0.070 -0.033 -0.055 -0.052 
 (1.7) (0.1) (1.1) (0.7) (1.2) (1.4) (0.6) (0.8) (0.5) 
logWt-1 -1.333 -1.229 -1.156 -1.136 -1.112 -1.009 -1.132 -1.179 -1.221 
 (13.3) (13.1) (11.9) (11.5) (11.4) (10.0) (10.9) (10.3) (8.3) 
ηw,U 0.224 -0.007 -0.063 -0.047 -0.078 -0.115 -0.035 -0.076 -0.031 
FEMALES 
 Dep var: logWt 
Deciles: 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Model without regional fixed effects    
logUt -0.272 -0.204 -0.184 -0.151 -0.124 -0.112 -0.071 -0.070 -0.070 
 (7.2) (6.1) (7.6) (6.6) (5.5) (5.3) (3.5) (3.4) (2.9) 
Model with fixed regional effects         
logUt 0.293 0.186 0.098 0.051 0.038 -0.002 0.017 -0.002 0.003 
  (2.0) (1.4) (1.0) (0.6) (0.4) (0.1) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3) 
Error Correction Model        
logUt-1 0.375 0.143 0.016 -0.024 0.029 -0.062 -0.062 -0.113 -0.027 
 (1.7) (0.6) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.5) (0.5) (0.9) (0.2) 
DeltaU 0.430 0.273 0.145 0.004 0.165 0.118 0.065 0.019 0.149 
 (2.0) (1.3) (1.0) (0.1) (1.3) (0.9) (0.6) (0.2) (1.2) 
logWt-1 -0.741 -1.129 -1.040 -1.055 -1.232 -1.369 -1.287 -1.338 -1.401 
          
ηw.U 0.506 0.127 0.015 -0.023 0.024 -0.045 -0.048 -0.084 -0.019 
Note: for Italy, 1991-2004, absolute t statistics based on robust s.e. are reported below each coefficient, 
models specification as in Table 1, dependent variable: regional fixed effects from a set of first step 
quantile regressions with individual micro-data (for each year, wage equations with controls for region, 
gender, years of education, experience, experience squared, tenure and tenure squared). 
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Table 3b: Estimates of the wage curve along the wage distribution by gender, GERMANY 
MALES 
 Dep var: logWt 
Deciles: 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Model without regional fixed effects      
logUt -0.349 -0.353 -0.363 -0.371 -0.390 -0.398 -0.409 -0.415 -0.444 
 (18.63) (19.29) (18.94) (19.11) (18.81) (18.79) (18.51) (17.94) (16.3) 
Model with fixed regional effects             
logUt 0.023 -0.039 0.001 -0.051 -0.051 -0.064 -0.060 -0.039 -0.070 
  (0.84) (2.33) (0.0) (3.5) (3.46) (3.33) (2.77) (1.27) (1.44) 
 Dep var: logWt-logWt-1 
Error Correction Model        
logUt-1 -0.023 -0.037 -0.030 -0.046 -0.042 -0.055 -0.045 -0.039 -0.041 
 (0.8) (1.9) (1.9) (3.2) (3.2) (3.4) (2.3) (1.6) (0.8) 
DeltaU 0.005 -0.030 -0.240 -0.029 -0.028 -0.045 -0.058 -0.088 -0.134 
 (0.1) (1.1) (1.0) (1.5) (1.6) (2.1) (2.1) (2.4) (2.0) 
logWt-1 -0.655 -0.563 -0.435 -0.512 -0.422 -0.468 -0.551 -0.419 -0.292 
 (6.9) (5.3) (5.2) (6.9) (4.9) (4.9) (6.2) (5.2) (2.2) 
ηw,U -0.035 -0.066 -0.069 -0.090 -0.100 -0.118 -0.082 -0.093 -0.140 
FEMALES 
 Dep var: logWt 
Deciles: 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Model without regional fixed effects    
logUt -0.157 -0.203 -0.210 -0.222 -0.227 -0.234 -0.249 -0.276 -0.360 
 (7.1) (10.0) (10.9) (12.1) (12.3) (13.0) (13.6) (13.9) (11.3) 
Model with fixed regional effects         
logUt -0.049 0.068 -0.035 -0.037 0.006 -0.041 -0.041 -0.073 -0.219 
  (1.6) (2.6) (1.3) (1.9) (0.3) (1.9) (2.0) (2.7) (2.1) 
Error Correction Model        
logUt-1 -0.108 0.042 -0.096 -0.037 -0.040 -0.076 -0.080 -0.114 -0.246 
 (2.8) (1.5) (3.1) (1.6) (2.0) (4.4) (4.1) (3.8) (2.5) 
DeltaU 0.015 0.001 0.006 -0.027 -0.007 -0.041 -0.018 -0.011 -0.027 
 (0.2) (0.0) (0.1) (0.9) (0.2) (1.5) (0.6) (0.3) (0.2) 
logWt-1 -0.929 -0.927 -0.713 -0.752 -0.670 -0.487 -0.558 -0.486 -0.420 
 (6.8) (8.5) (5.8) (5.9) (6.9) (6.0) (5.4) (4.1) (1.5) 
ηw.U -0.116 0.045 -0.135 -0.049 -0.060 -0.156 -0.143 -0.235 -0.586 
Note: for Germany, 1996-2003, absolute t statistics based on robust s.e. are reported below each 
coefficient, models specification as in Table 1, dependent variable: regional fixed effects from a set of 
first step quantile regressions with individual micro-data (for each year, wage equations with controls for 




Table 3c: Estimates of the wage curve along the wage distribution by region, ITALY 
NORTH 
 Dep var: logWt 
Deciles: 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Model without regional fixed effects      
logUt -0.111 -0.12 -0.092 -0.089 -0.092 -0.092 -0.074 -0.065 -0.061 
 (4.0) (4.6) (4.2) (4.2) (4.0) (3.8) (2.9) (2.3) (1.8) 
Model with fixed regional effects             
logUt 0.029 0.053 0.044 0.036 0.033 0.019 0.047 0.029 0.027 
  (0.6) (1.1) (1.1) (1.1) (1.0) (0.6) (1.3) (0.7) (0.6) 
 Dep var: logWt-logWt-1 
Error Correction Model        
logUt-1 0.094 0.050 0.042 -0.009 -0.051 -0.068 -0.043 -0.089 -0.084 
 (1.2) (0.6) (0.7) (0.2) (0.9) (1.3) (0.6) (1.4) (0.3) 
DeltaU -0.027 0.019 0.0340 0.001 -0.023 -0.006 0.008 -0.034 -0.027 
 (0.4) (0.3) (0.6) (0.1) (0.4) (0.1) (0.1) (0.6) (0.3) 
logWt-1 -1.317 -1.207 -1.138 -1.222 -1.158 -1.082 -0.996 -0.882 -1.171 
 (10.5) (8.9) (8.9) (8.6) (8.7) (8.1) (6.8) (6.5) (6.9) 
ηw,U 0.071 0.041 0.037 -0.007 -0.044 -0.063 -0.043 -0.101 -0.072 
SOUTH 
 Dep var: logWt 
Deciles: 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Model without regional fixed effects    
logUt -0.097 -0.067 -0.057 -0.024 -0.001 -0.018 0.062 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.7) (0.8) (0.7) (0.4) (0.1) (0.3) (1.1) (0.1) (0.1) 
Model with fixed regional effects         
logUt 0.317 0.114 0.081 0.069 0.050 0.046 0.160 0.068 0.106 
  (1.4) (0.7) (0.6) (0.5) (0.4) (0.4) (1.5) (0.6) (0.4) 
Error Correction Model        
logUt-1 0.256 0.084 0.022 -0.078 -0.005 -0.055 -0.055 0.118 -0.025 
 (0.7) (0.3) (0.1) (0.4) (0.1) (0.3) (0.3) (0.6) (0.1) 
DeltaU 0.399 0.229 0.075 0.025 0.020 0.009 -0.076 0.047 0.032 
 (1.3) (1.2) (0.4) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1) (0.5) (0.3) (0.1) 
logWt-1 -1.314 -1.309 -1.125 -1.189 -1.248 -1.131 -0.981 -1.300 -1.410 
 (7.3) (8.4) (6.5) (6.9) (7.9) (6.2) (5.3) (6.6) (4.3) 
ηw.U 0.195 0.064 0.020 -0.066 -0.004 -0.049 -0.056 0.091 -0.018 
Note: for Italy, 1991-2004, absolute t statistics based on robust s.e. are reported below each coefficient, 
models specification as in Table 1, dependent variable: regional fixed effects from a set of first step 
quantile regressions with individual micro-data (for each year, wage equations with controls for region, 




Table 3c: Estimates of the wage curve along the wage distribution by region, GERMANY 
WEST 
 Dep var: logWt 
Deciles: 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Model without regional fixed effects      
logUt -0.013 -0.032 -0.046 -0.052 -0.061 -0.067 -0.075 -0.083 -0.074 
 (0.93) (2.52) (3.42) (4.06) (4.93) (5.11) (5.63) (5.19) (1.9) 
Model with fixed regional effects             
logUt 0.009 -0.01 -0.009 -0.004 -0.005 -0.020 -0.015 -0.023 0.267 
  (0.23) (0.34) (0.4) (0.12) (0.21) (0.6) (0.47) (0.47) (1.22) 
 Dep var: logWt-logWt-1 
Error Correction Model        
logUt-1 -0.041 -0.053 -0.025 -0.032 -0.045 -0.054 -0.020 -0.020 0.247 
 (1.0) (1.7) (0.9) (1.2) (2.1) (1.9) (0.6) (0.4) (1.2) 
DeltaU 0.024 0.015 0.021 0.009 -0.026 -0.036 -0.021 -0.057 0.010 
 (0.5) (0.4) (0.6) (0.3) (0.9) (0.9) (0.5) (1.0) (0.1) 
logWt-1 -0.634 -0.734 -0.562 -0.568 -0.439 -0.452 -0.526 -0.393 -0.247 
 (3.8) (4.3) (2.7) (3.7) (2.7) (3.2) (3.3) (2.9) (1.1) 
ηw,U -0.065 -0.072 -0.044 -0.056 -0.103 -0.119 -0.038 -0.051 1.000 
EAST 
 Dep var: logWt 
Deciles: 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Model without regional fixed effects    
logUt -0.044 -0.125 -0.128 -0.102 -0.175 -0.171 -0.164 -0.215 -0.304 
 (0.3) (0.9) (1.0) (0.8) (1.2) (1.2) (1.1) (1.4) (1.6) 
Model with fixed regional effects         
logUt -0.166 -0.098 -0.137 -0.149 -0.147 -0.197 -0.197 -0.275 -0.479 
  (2.3) (2.2) (3.3) (3.4) (4.1) (4.2) (3.4) (3.2) (3.5) 
Error Correction Model        
logUt-1 -0.236 -0.158 -0.143 -0.108 -0.125 -0.105 -0.085 -0.236 -0.329 
 (2.6) (4.5) (3.9) (2.8) (3.6) (2.5) (1.4) (2.1) (1.6) 
DeltaU -0.097 -0.078 -0.095 -0.091 -0.058 -0.085 -0.051 -0.098 -0.182 
 (1.3) (2.1) (2.6) (2.6) (1.6) (3.2) (1.2) (1.3) (1.3) 
logWt-1 -0.782 -0.534 -0.532 -0.527 -0.503 -0.502 -0.402 -0.526 -0.389 
 (4.4) (5.1) (3.9) (5.2) (4.0) (3.3) (2.8) (3.7) (2.7) 
ηw.U -0.302 -0.296 -0.269 -0.205 -0.249 -0.209 -0.211 -0.449 -0.846 
Note: for Germany, 1996-2003, absolute t statistics based on robust s.e. are reported below each 
coefficient, models specification as in Table 1, dependent variable: regional fixed effects from a set of 
first step quantile regressions with individual micro-data (for each year, wage equations with controls for 
region, gender, years of education, experience, experience squared, tenure and tenure squared). 
 
 
